

Quantum fully homomorphic encryption with verification





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


Yfke Dulek, Christian Schaffner,



arXiv:1708.09156


A Possible Future for Quantum Computing



Outline

- 1. (Quantum) Fully Homomorphic Encryption
- 2. Classical application: zero-knowledge proofs
- 3. Our contributions:
 - Definitions
 - Construction
 - Application

Classical Fully Homomorphic Encryption




Homomorphic if y = f(x)

Classical FHE possible [Gen09] under comp assumptions. Current focus: efficiency

[Gen09] Gentry. A fully homomorphic encryption scheme. PhD thesis, 2009.

Quantum Fully Homomorphic Encryption



Homomorphic if $\rho = C(\sigma)$

Quantum FHE possible [DSS16] under comp assumptions. Current focus: efficiency

[DSS16] Dulek, Schaffner, and Speelman. Quantum homomorphic encryption for polynomial-sized circuits. CRYPTO 2016.

Applications of Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Practical application: outsourcing computations



Theoretical applications (classical): multiparty computation, functional encryption, private information retrieval, zero-knowledge proofs, and more...

Theoretical applications (quantum): ???

Zero-knowledge proofs (classical)

<u>SAT</u>: given a formula ϕ , is ϕ satisfiable?

I know! ϕ is satisfiable!

Wonderful! Can you prove it to me? I am only a polynomial-time human...

Well, I know a satisfying assignment *w*, but I am not going to tell YOU...

Let's do a zero-knowledge proof!



Zero-knowledge from FHE (classical)

$$\overline{w} \leftarrow Enc_k(w)$$

 $b \in_{R} \{0,1\}$

(verifier)

 $\begin{array}{l} \text{if } b = 1: \bar{c} \leftarrow \text{Eval}_{evk}(\text{witness-check-fn}, \overline{w}) \\ \text{if } b = 0: \bar{c} \leftarrow \text{Eval}_{evk}(\text{set-to-0}, \overline{w}) \end{array} \end{array}$

 $c \leftarrow Dec_k(\bar{c})$

if c = b, accept (otherwise reject)

Prover cannot cheat... but verifier can!

(prover)

[Bar12] Barak. The Swiss Army Knife of Cryptography. "Windows on Theory" blog post, 2012.

Zero-knowledge from FHE (classical)

 $\overline{W} \leftarrow \operatorname{Enc}_k(W)$

 $b \in_R \{0,1\}$

 $\begin{cases} \text{if } b = 1: \bar{c} \leftarrow \text{Eval}_{evk}(\text{witness-check-fn}, \overline{w}) \\ \text{if } b = 0: \bar{c} \leftarrow \text{Eval}_{evk}(\text{set-to-0}, \overline{w}) \end{cases} \end{cases}$

commit to $c \leftarrow Dec_k(\bar{c})$

(prover)

< proof of computation (transcript)</pre>

if transcript is ok, reveal c

if c = b, accept (otherwise reject)

(*verifier*) [Bar12] Barak. The Swiss Army Knife of Cryptography. "Windows on Theory" blog post, 2012.

- Verification of computation is crucial in applications
- Classical FHE has verification "automatically"
- Quantum FHE does not

✓ Verification of computation is crucial in applications



I will only accept your output if I can verify that you applied the right circuit to my input!



- Classical FHE has verification "automatically"
- Quantum FHE does not

Verification of computation is crucial in applications
 Classical FHE has verification "automatically"

Here is a transcript of all the steps in my computation, please check them all.



Quantum FHE does not

- Verification of computation is crucial in applications
- Classical FHE has verification "automatically"
- Quantum FHE does not
 Measurement and no-cloning prevent this easy solution



The outcome of that measurement was 0, truly! You must believe me!



- Quantum authentication
- Quantum computing on authenticated data
- Quantum fully homomorphic encryption

Quantum authentication

- "verifiable HE" for the identity circuit
- e.g. polynomial code [BCG+06], Clifford code [ABE10], trap code [BGS12]

Hold this qubit, I will be *right* back!



Quantum computing on authenticated data

Quantum fully homomorphic encryption

[BCG+02] Barnum, Crepeau, Gottesman, Smith, and Tapp. Authentication of quantum messages. FOCS 2002. [ABE10] Aharonov, Ben-Or, and Eban. Interactive proofs for quantum computations. ICS 2010. [BGS12] Broadbent, Gutoski, and Stebila. Quantum one-time programs. CRYPTO 2013.

- Quantum authentication
- Quantum computing on authenticated data
 - interaction during evaluation
 - verification



Quantum fully homomorphic encryption

[BCG+02] Barnum, Crepeau, Gottesman, Smith, and Tapp. Authentication of quantum messages. FOCS 2002. [ABE10] Aharonov, Ben-Or, and Eban. Interactive proofs for quantum computations. ICS 2010. [BGS12] Broadbent, Gutoski, and Stebila. Quantum one-time programs. CRYPTO 2013.

- Quantum authentication
- Quantum computing on authenticated data
- Quantum fully homomorphic encryption
 - no interaction during evaluation
 - no verification

$\left\{$	The result of your computation is 42.		
	Ok!	}	

[BCG+02] Barnum, Crepeau, Gottesman, Smith, and Tapp. Authentication of quantum messages. FOCS 2002. [ABE10] Aharonov, Ben-Or, and Eban. Interactive proofs for quantum computations. ICS 2010. [BGS12] Broadbent, Gutoski, and Stebila. Quantum one-time programs. CRYPTO 2013.

Our contributions


Definitions

Construction: a verifiable QFHE scheme

Application: quantum one-time programs

Defns: Verification in QFHE

Dec replaced by **VerDec**: $k, \bar{\rho}, C, proof \rightarrow \rho, accept/reject$



Verifiability: $\forall poly A \exists poly Sim \forall \sigma, side info, C:$ REAL and IDEAL are indistinguishable

Defns: Verification in QFHE

Variant (indistinguishability)

- Alternative security definition in terms of a guessing game
 - Adversary has to guess whether he interacts with actual or idealized functionality
- Proven equivalent to semantic definition

Compactness

- Verification: (classical) proof, output accept/reject
- Decryption: quantum input, runtime should not depend on circuit

Construction: Verifiable QFHE

Ingredients


- Quantum authentication code: trap code
- Classical FHE: any quantum-secure scheme with low-depth decryption
- Classical MAC: any quantum-secure scheme

[BGS12] Broadbent, Gutoski, and Stebila. Quantum one-time programs. CRYPTO 2013.

Construction: Verifiable QFHE traps: |0>, |+>

Encryption

Authenticate with trap code



error-correcting code
 traps in random positions
 quantum one-time pad
 secret key: positions + pad keys

Encode secret key with classical FHE+MAC

Encrypted qubit: (classical encrypted info, trap code qubits)

Construction: Verifiable QFHE

Evaluation

Clifford operations (X, Z, H, P, CNOT): Apply transversally (magic states) Update encoded keys using FHE

T gate:

After applying, unwanted P error Use (new, extended) gadget to remove the error (using ideas from [DSS16])

Verify & Decrypt

Check (classical) MAC+FHE transcript of key updates Decrypt trap code if everything checks out

[DSS16] Dulek, Schaffner, and Speelman. Quantum homomorphic encryption for polynomial-sized circuits. CRYPTO 2016.

Application: one-time programs

Idea: Programs that 'self-destruct'

after a single execution

- Ingredients:
 - Classical one-time program
 - Verifiable QFHE scheme
- Simple construction
 - Q-OTP for C: (evk, OTP for VerDec(C,k,·), $Enc_k(C)$)
- Not a new result [BGS12]



Proof of correct execution is classical

Summary

Definitions

- verifiability (semantic)
- verifiability (indistinguishability)
- compactness
- Construction: a verifiable QFHE scheme
- Application: quantum one-time programs

Summary

Definitions

Construction: a verifiable QFHE scheme

Ingredients:

- classical FHE
- classical authentication code (MAC)
- quantum authentication code (trap code)
- Application: quantum one-time programs

Summary

Definitions

- Construction: a verifiable QFHE scheme
- Application: quantum one-time programs
 Alternative construction to [BGS12]. Ingredients:
 - classical one-time programs
 - QFHE with verification

[BGS12] Broadbent, Gutoski, and Stebila. Quantum one-time programs. CRYPTO 2013.

Future work / open questions

 Apply verifiable QFHE to build other advanced cryptographic primitives

• Are non-leveled schemes possible?

• Reduce client quantum capabilities

